We locate the micro-foundations of social order in the cultural meanings of institutional identities and roles, the daily enactment of which ensures social order through the continual reproduction and legitimation of social institutions. Following discussion of a general conceptual model, we discuss two complementary, micro-level explanations of social order: a cognitive approach combining a classic micro-sociological theory of institutions with a recent method for analyzing the causal structures of social actions in institutional settings; and an affective approach based on affect control theory. We then present two analyses illustrating specifi c sectors of our conceptual model. The fi rst deals with cognitive meanings, showing how social institutions are present as associative structures within individuals' minds, enabling them to defi ne situations in institutional contexts. The second demonstrates how the evaluation, potency, and activity dimensions of affective meaning employed by affect control theory correspond to the structure of interdependence relations as represented in game matrices.
In the augmented symbolic interactionist perspective that we present here, human activities are stimulated and maintained by cognitive and affective meanings, and change emerges as new human activities evolve or are consciously designed in ways that instigate new meanings. This symbolic interactionism is "augmented" in that it incorporates affective meanings along with cognitive meanings, and it allows for multiple kinds of human activities, from various kinds of thought to individual behavior to coordinated group actions.
In this framework, cognitive experiences of successive generations accumulate as practical knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 1966 ) , while emotional experiences accumulate as cultural sentiments (Heise 2007 ; MacKinnon and Heise 2010 ) . Through socialization, individuals internalize both kinds of cultural meaning; and by employing practical knowledge and cultural sentiments to guide and motivate their interpersonal activities, they ensure the continual reproduction of the organized activities that embody society.
Social order is the outcome of complex, reciprocal relations among cultural and social processes at different levels of analysis, as portrayed in Figure 9 .1 , from MacKinnon and Heise's 2010 book. MacKinnon and Heise used this fi gure to explain the construction and interplay of selves and social institutions, but a lot of conceptual territory was left unanalyzed in their presentation. In this chapter, we employ Figure 9 .1 as a theoretical scaffold for explaining selected aspects of social order.
Following a review and elaboration of the general conceptual model portrayed in Figure 9 .1 , we present two more detailed examinations of linkages represented in the model. The fi rst deals with cognitive meanings, combining ideas from Berger and Luckmann's ( 1966 ) theory of social reality with event structure analysis (Heise 2014a (Heise , 1989 Heise and Durig 1997 ) , and uses a form of meaning analysis introduced by MacKinnon and Heise ( 2010 ) . This shows for the fi rst time that major social institutions are present as structures of association within individuals' minds, so individuals are able to defi ne situations in terms of the cultural templates for social institutions. The second examination deals with affective meanings as developed in affect control theory (Heise Identities, Roles, and Social Institutions 167 1979 , 2007 ; MacKinnon 1994 ; MacKinnon and Heise 2010 ; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988 ; Hoey, Schröder, and Alhothali 2013 ) . We show a linkage between affective meanings and material reward structures that bind individuals into interdependences. Thereby patterns of cooperation and confl ict, of domination and servitude, are maintained by cultural sentiments about identities, while at the same time emergent patterns of cooperation, confl ict, domination, and servitude re-form cultural sentiments.
In the conclusion to this chapter, we summarize our theoretical discussions and fi ndings and discuss them in the context of other theories of social order based on consensus and consistency.
Theoretical Framework

Elements of Society
Horizontally, Figure 9 .1 distinguishes between a society's objectifi ed meanings and embodied processes ; vertically, among macro-sociological , micro-sociological , and individual levels of analysis. At the macro-sociological level, objectifi ed meanings refer to semantic systems in which meanings of identities, settings, and behaviors are integrated into clusters that defi ne the normative confi gurations of social institutions. At the micro-sociological level are the cognitive and affective meanings of identities that generate and control role-enactments. At the individual level, concepts' cognitive and affective meanings are constituted psychologically and involved in various kinds of thought. The diagram foregrounds identities that the individual has incorporated into the self-concept -the me -and thought processes that are involved in self-maintenance. However, as discussed later, the individual level involves other meanings and additional kinds of thought processes. At the macro-sociological level embodied processes refer to organized actions , integrated action systems (Heise 2014 ; Heise and Durig 1997 ) including functioning organizations. These action systems materially instantiate social institutions, and their natural evolution provides a path by which social institutions themselves evolve. At the micro-sociological level are interpersonal activities , including face-to-face conversations and social interaction between individuals who are electronically co-present. Material and symbolic rewards and punishments during interactions create patterns of role interdependence that provide a path for environmental changes in identity meanings. At the individual level are thought processes, perception, and corporal behavior. Thought processes include I-you dialogues , the internal dialogue of self where the pronominal you is addressed to self rather than to other people, 1 and other 1 While we have drawn the pronominal terms from Wiley's (1994) I-you-me semiotic model of the self, we have separated me's from I-you dialogues to be consistent with the distinction in Figure 9 .1 between meanings and processes. forms of mental activity as well. Of particular importance in this chapter is the process of defi ning the situation on the basis of internalized conceptions about identities along with perceptions of the immediate environment.
Referring to the center of the model, social institutions are represented as the integration of a society's semantic systems and organized actions. This is consistent with the conventional defi nition of a social institution as the intersection of cultural structure (patterns or regularities in culturally shared beliefs and sentiments) and social structure (patterns or regularities in social interaction) (House 1981 ; Merton 1957 ; Parsons and Shils 1951 ; Wallace 1983 ) . Moving down to the next level, roles are represented as the merging of the cultural meanings of identities and interpersonal activities -the intersection of culture and social structure at the micro-sociological level (Gross, Mason, and McEachern 1958 ; Sarbin 1968 ; Wallace 1983 ). This idea is captured by Sarbin's statement that a role "connotes not only overt actions and performances but also covert expectations held by an observer or by a group of observers " ( 1968 : 546) . Finally, at the individual level in the diagram, selves are represented as the intersection of me's (identities and other self-meanings) and I-you dialogues.
Turning to the relations among constructs in Figure 9 .1 , the horizontal block arrows represent the reciprocal effects of objectifi ed meanings and embodied processes at each level of analysis. At the macro-sociological level, existing cultural meanings generally shape organizational structures and actions; but as organization activities evolve, they effect changes in the meanings of relevant identities, actions, and settings. At the micro-sociological level, identity meanings generally shape interpersonal activities, as elaborated in affect control theory, but creative performance of roles can change the meanings of identities. And, fi nally, at the individual level, the internal dialogue of self generally invokes familiar identities, but it can also modify existing self-conceptions or create new ones.
The vertical pairs of line arrows in Figure 9 .1 represent the reciprocal effects of elements at different levels, with separate pairs for objectifi ed meanings and embodied processes because connections of cultural meanings between-levels can be distinct from connections of embodied processes between-levels. Referring to the left side of Figure 9 .1 , cultural systems of meanings at the macro-sociological level are largely constructed from identity meanings at the micro-sociological level, and that is refl ected in the upward arrow between the two levels of meanings. At the same time, changes in cultural systems of meaning may change the meanings of specifi c identities, and that is refl ected in the downward arrow. Referring to the connections between self-meanings (me's) and identity meanings, the upward arrow represents the fact that every individual creates a unique, personal identity or persona; the downward arrow, that most of an individual's self-conceptions consist of preexisting cultural identities.
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Referring to the right side of Figure 9 .1 , the upward arrow denotes that organized actions at the macro-sociological level are constituted from social interaction at the micro-sociological level and can change as interactions change; the downward arrow, that changes in the social structure and actions of organizations can affect routine social interaction. Finally, as indicated by an upward arrow, internal dialogues motivate social interaction; but, as indicated by a downward arrow, social interaction is incorporated into an individual's internal dialogue.
In summary, each set of arrows in Figure 9 .1 represents an important sociological or social psychological process contributing to social order. While each process deserves in-depth analysis, we cannot accomplish this in a single chapter. Therefore, following a discussion of identities, roles, and social institutions, and the cognitive and affective basis of social order, we focus on two sectors of Figure 9 .1 : (a) the cognitive representation of macro-sociological phenomena in individual minds (Semantic Systems ←→ Identities ←→ conceptions in individual minds); and (b) the interplay between culturally-defi ned identities and embodied interpersonal activities (Identities ←→ Roles ←→ Interpersonal Activities). We present an empirical analysis related to each.
The fi rst analysis connects the psychological conceptions of identities in individual minds to semantic systems at the macro-level -the cultural component of social institutions (left side of Figure 9 .1 ). Specifi cally a network analysis of word associations shows that the full range of social institutions is available psychologically, with activation of one institutional identity and role in an individual's mind evoking other identities and roles within the same institution.
The second analysis connects the affective-connotative meanings of identities to roles and interpersonal activities at the micro-sociological level. This analysis shows how the evaluation, potency, and activity dimensions of affective meaning employed in affect control refl ect the structure of game matrices employed by interdependence, exchange, and rational choice theories, connecting affect control theory and its theory of social order to cognitive-rational theories in social psychology. Changes in the meanings of identities and roles at the level of interpersonal activities should produce gradual changes in organized actions at the macro-sociological level -the social structural component of social institutions (right side of Figure 9 .1 ).
Before presenting these two analyses, however, we must fi rst discuss the foundational concepts of identities, roles and social institutions and the cognitive-affective processes at the base of all sectors of the model of social order represented in Figure 9 .1 .
Identity, Roles, and Social Institutions
Identities are social categories or positions with which people identify and that they may appropriate as self-conceptions. Every identity is related to a (Heise 1979 (Heise , 2007 MacKinnon 1994 ) -for example, the identity of doctor is confi rmed by role-appropriate actions such as medicating and healing. The various data bases of affect control theory contain hundreds of institutional identities (e.g., mother, doctor, patient, evangelist, professor, salesman), and affect control simulations have provided many examples of predicting institutionally-scripted behavior corresponding to social roles.
3
Identities connect to roles, and roles are the micro-sociological counterpart of social institutions (see discussion of Figure 9 .1 ). These ideas accord with Berger and Luckmann's ( 1966 ) micro-sociological theory of social institutions. First, the theory proclaims that the evolution of social institutions is coextensive with the emergence of a typology of actors (institutional identities) and related actions (institutional roles) ( 1966 ); 4 second, that "the institutional order is real only insofar as it is realized in performed roles " ( 1966 : 78-79) , and is without "an ontological status apart from the human activity that produced it" ( 1966 : 60-61). The institutional world becomes subjectively real to people as they internalize institutional roles as identities, so-called because "internalization entails identifi cation with the role and its appropriate norms" (Berger and Luckmann 1966 : 139) .
Because institutional identities and roles are associated with counteridentities and roles (e.g., husband for wife; patient for doctor), they embody relational meanings 5 guiding and shaping social interaction ( interpersonal activities in Figure 9 .1 ). According to affect control simulations, for example, a judge might remind or caution an attorney but convict or sentence a thief (Heise 1979 : 108) . Because of their relational meanings, institutional roles have been described as "role integrates" (Parsons and Shils 1951 ) or as representing "an entire institutional nexus of conduct" (Berger and Luckmann 1966 : 75) , exemplifi ed by a doctor's relationships with patients and other practitioners in the medical system. Because of such relational meanings, social institutions can be identifi ed from semantic network analysis of the dictionary meanings of identities, as MacKinnon and Heise ( 2010 ) have shown. Later in this chapter, we show how social institutions can also be revealed by network analysis of word associations.
2 To distinguish them from social or collective identities, which refer to identifi cation with a group or collectivity rather than with an institutional role (see Thoits and Virshup 1997 and MacKinnon and Heise 2010 for discussions of this distinction). 3 The affect control model also generates meaningful predictions for deviant identities and roles, as well as for improvised identities and roles in novel situations. 4 "Institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typifi cation of habitualized actions by types of actors . Put differently, any such typifi cation is an institution (Berger and Luckmann 1966 : 54 . Emphasis added)." 5 The relational meaning of identities and roles is emphasized by Burke ( 1980 ) . Just as roles in the external social structure are given meaning by their relation to counter-roles, he argues, identities in the internal structure of the self derive their meaning from their relation to counteridentities. Although, by itself, the relational nature of institutional identities and roles makes an important contribution to our understanding of social institutions and social order, we must delve deeper into the underlying social psychological processes to attain a more profound understanding of social order. We begin with cognitive explanations, showing why they are not suffi cient by themselves to explain social order. Berger and Luckmann's ( 1966 ) micro-sociological theory of social institutions contains an implicit cognitive theory of social order based on the practical knowledge of social institutions acquired by adequately-socialized people. Like Mead ( 1934 ) , they begin with the idea that language has enabled the human organism to objectify everyday experience as objects of consciousness and to attach meanings to these cognitions. Over time, meanings coalesce into "semantic fi elds or zones of meaning" that accumulate in a society as institutional knowledge.
6 Institutional knowledge is "learned as objective truth in the course of socialization and . . . internalized as subjective reality " ( 1966 : 67) . Institutional knowledge is mostly taken-for-granted, practical, and unrefl ective -"the sum total of 'what everybody knows' about the social world " ( 1966 : 65) . At the level of particular institutions, "recipe knowledge" -"knowledge limited to pragmatic competence in routine performances" ( 1966 : 42) -defi nes the available identities and roles, and provides guidelines for institutionally appropriate behavior. Finally, institutional knowledge is socially distributed , not only along institutional lines, but also by "degrees of familiarity" ( 1966 : 43) and "relevance structures" ( 1966 : 45) within a particular institution. For example, an individual's own identities and roles in an institutional setting are generally more familiar and relevant than those of other people in that setting.
Practical knowledge of the institutional world is the basis of social order -"the well-socialized individual simply 'knows' that his social world is a consistent whole" (Berger and Luckmann 1966 : 64) . This sense of cognitive coherence is arrived at in a "derivative fashion" as individuals refl ect upon their everyday institutional actions and integrate them into a "subjectively meaningful universe" that is shared with other members of a society ( 1966 : 65) . And it is the transcendental and integrative power of language that enables people to connect and integrate different zones of meaning within particular institutions and within the overall institutional order itself.
Although quite compelling, there is a major problem with Berger and Luckmann's cognitive explanation of social order -its failure to address the problem of motivation . In terms of the two functions attributed to human motivation in the psychological literature: mobilization and direction , practical knowledge may direct individual action in institutional settings but it is not suffi cient to mobilize it. 7 Cognitions must be imbued with affect in order to energize the mobilization of action (MacKinnon 1994 ) . This leads into a discussion of another cognitive theory of social order based on practical institutional knowledge that addresses the problem of motivation.
Event Structure Analysis (ESA ) (Heise 2014 ; Heise and Durig 1997 ) analyzes social actions in terms of causal linkages and outcomes. The theory focuses on action schemes -knowledge structures specifying actions that must take place along a causal linkage in order for outcome actions to occur. People employ action schemes for everyday activities such as going to work or making dinner, and action schemes structure routine activities in organizational and institutional settings. In general, action schemes operate at a preconscious level of cognition and unfold more or less automatically. Thus, the concept comes close to Berger and Luckmann's ( 1966 ) concept of practical or recipe knowledge discussed above.
Unlike Berger and Luckmann's explanation of social order, however, ESA recognizes the motivational problem in collaborative actions -that agents must be motivated to initiate and perform actions reliably along each step of a causal linkage in order for predictable outcomes to occur. Drawing from affect control theory, ESA proposes that people are motivated to initiate intrinsically fulfi lling actions, especially actions that confi rm organizational identities with which they personally identify and value (Heise 1979 (Heise , 2007 MacKinnon 1994 ) , creating a sense of self-actualization and authenticity (MacKinnon and Heise 2010 ).
8
Affect control theory proposes that people are motivated to act in ways that confi rm cultural sentiments for the identities of self and others in a situation. For example, a doctor is expected to assist, medicate, and cure a patient; a mother, to nurture and protect a child. What actually occurs in a situation, however, produces transient feelings that may or may not be consistent with the cultural sentiments for the identities of interactants. For example, a doctor who harms a patient or a mother who hits a child produces transient feelings that deviate dramatically from the cultural sentiments for the identities of doctor and mother, as well as for the recipients of their actions, patient and child. The discrepancy between cultural sentiments and transient feelings is called defl ection in affect control theory, so 7 Of course, practical knowledge in itself can be motivating in the limited sense that knowing what is expected (e.g., how to perform an institutional role) eliminates the impediment to action of cognitive uncertainty. From our position, however, practical knowledge contributes to the mobilization of action indirectly by evoking feelings of competence. Along with feelings of evaluation and activity, feelings of competence (potency) mobilize the required actions (e.g., role performances) to achieve an outcome (e.g., confi rming an identity). 8 In the absence of this kind of intrinsic motivation, ESA acknowledges that organizational actions that are unlikely to be intrinsically fulfi lling for most people (e.g., assembly line work) must be made reliable by the application of power schemes -auxiliary action schemes that motivate people when the central action schemes of an organization prove unfulfi lling. confi rming cultural sentiments for the identities of self and others is equivalent to minimizing defl ection. Cultural sentiments are measured by the EPA (evaluation, potency, activity) dimensions of affective meaning (Osgood 1962 (Osgood , 1969 Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 1957 ; Osgood, May, and Miron 1975 ) , where evaluation concerns goodness versus badness; potency concerns powerfulness versus powerlessness; and activity concerns liveliness versus quietness.
9 Transient feelings are also measured in EPA terms, enabling affect control theory to mathematically generate an ideal EPA profi le for actions that would minimize defl ection and optimally confi rm the identities of interactants in a situation.
Because minimizing defl ection is equivalent to maintaining consistency with cultural sentiments, the motivational principle of affect control also explains social order. People avoid defl ection in institutional settings by enacting institutionally appropriate identities and roles; but in doing so, they simultaneously reproduce and legitimate the institutions in which these identities and roles are embedded.
The cognitive theory of social order implicit in Berger and Luckmann ( 1966 ) and the affective theory of social order contained in affect control theory are complementary explanations, each focusing on a different mode of meaning. At the same time, neither approach ignores the mode of meaning emphasized by the other. Berger and Luckmann, for example, acknowledge that successful learning and performance of an institutional role requires, not only the acquisition of cognitive knowledge and specialized skills, but also the "affective layers of the body of knowledge that is directly and indirectly appropriate to this role" ( 1966 : 77) . And although affect control theory emphasizes the affective basis of social order, it acknowledges the cognitive work involved in defi ning a situation and selecting among alternative actions that are affectively comparable (Heise 1979 (Heise , 2007 MacKinnon 1994 ) . In other words, role performances that are affectively motivated and bounded are also cognitively constrained by institutional limits. Under ordinary circumstance, for example, judges do not medicate and doctors do not sentence.
Cognitive and affective meanings are also connected intimately by the fact that each word in a language has both a cognitive-denotative meaning and an affective-connotative meaning. Affect control theory models the reciprocal process of translation between the two domains of meaning (see Heise 1979 : 48-49) . The advantage of working with affective meaning lies in its dimensional simplicity. Compared to the dimensional complexity and indeterminate content of cognitive meaning, affective meaning can be represented in three simple dimensions -evaluation, potency, and activity -enabling quantitative measurement and mathematical modeling of affective processes.
In conclusion, both cognitive and affective explanations are necessary for a comprehensive understanding of social order. Guided by practical institutional knowledge and energized by internalized cultural sentiments, adequately-socialized individuals ensure the continual reproduction and legitimation of social institutions through the daily enactment of institutional identities and roles. This is an extremely important idea. Social institutions are reproduced and continually legitimated -at even the most macro level of abstraction -through symbolic and situational action at the micro level of face-to-face interaction. Despite their emphasis on symbolic interaction and the causal priority of the immediate situation, symbolic interactionists embracing Blumer's ( 1969 ) views have missed this point, largely because of their aversion to macro-sociological concepts.
With these theoretical discussions in hand, we now turn to the two analyses representing specifi c sectors and pathways identifi ed in our detailed discussion of Figure 9 .1 .
Social Institutions in the Mind
MacKinnon and Heise ( 2010 ) showed that dictionary defi nitions link identities in the same institution to each other and to actions and objects relevant to the institution. For example, according to a dictionary defi nition, a nurse is someone who cares for patients under the supervision of a physician, and this defi nition relates the identity of nurse to the identity of patient by the action of caring for, while relating the identity of nurse to the identity of physician by the physician's action of supervising. Through analysis of hundreds of such dictionary defi nitions, MacKinnon and Heise showed interrelations among key identities in each social institution.
Dictionary defi nitions are cultural in that they are derived from interpersonal communications; that is, contemporary lexicologists compose defi nitions by examining word usages in multi-million-word corpuses of printed text. Thus, the MacKinnon-Heise analyses established that the cultural side of macro social structure is embedded in meanings of specifi c concepts, as expected in an augmented version of symbolic interactionism.
However, a richer understanding of social order must go beyond formal defi nitions of words and indicate how social structure is constituted within individuals' minds. Individuals do not memorize dictionary defi nitions of identities, yet they employ identity names in ways that imply the defi nitions. What goes on in people's heads that links institutional identities to one another, and that allows individuals to reproduce social structure while going about their practical affairs? We address this issue next by elaborating the individual layer in Figure 9 .1 to incorporate additional psychological structures besides the "me" and additional psychological processes besides "I-you" dialogues. We show empirically for the fi rst time that social institutions exist not merely as patterns of cultural meaning but also as networks of mental associations, with consciousness of one role-identity evoking consciousness of other role-identities within the same institutional cluster. Thereby an individual's perceptual identifi cation of another person fans out into consciousness of other identities in the same social institution, allowing the perceiver to choose an appropriate reciprocal role-identity. For example, encountering another fi tted out with a white coat and stethoscope and identifying that person as a doctor primes other medicine-related identities like nurse and patient, thereby readying an appropriate self-identity for reciprocal interaction with the doctor. Our data are norms of word associations provided by Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber ( 1998 ) , based on 5,019 stimulus words and responses by more than 6,000 participants from the 1970s through the 1990s. 10 We focused on 409 stimuli designating role-identities.
11 All responses to a stimulus given by at least 2 out of 150 respondents were included in analyses, with no distinction between the most frequent and the least frequent responses.
Our analytic procedures paralleled those reported by MacKinnon and Heise ( 2010 ) . In brief, we constructed a zero-one matrix with stimuli as columns and responses as rows. Ones in a column indicated role-identity responses to a stimulus, as well as responses that were not role-identities. 12 The matrix was used to compute correlations of the role-identity stimuli with each other, and the correlation matrix was analyzed into principal components, with varimax rotation of the top twenty components. Lists of identities defi ning each component were constructed by including all identities with loadings of 0.30 or more on that component. In sections below identities are listed in order of their loading sizes on a given component.
We organize results of our analyses in terms of the six social institutions that Turner ( 1997 ) used to examine the macro-sociological order of societieseconomy, kinship, religion, polity, law, and education. In discussing results, we 10 Respondents wrote the fi rst word that came to mind in response to a printed stimulus word.
Multiple associates were obtained for each stimulus because different participants often wrote different response words. Each participant responded to 100-120 English words, and an average of 149 participants responded to each stimulus. The researchers corrected obvious spelling errors in the responses, and pooled singular and plural forms of nouns and variations in tense and grammatical form in the case of verbs. 11 A stimulus was included in our study if it was an obvious identity or if two or more responses were synonymous identities or reciprocal identities, when assuming that the stimulus was a role-identity. For example, "fool" might be interpreted as either a noun or a verb, and it was included because "idiot" and "clown" were among the responses. Three identities -"person," "woman," and "man" -were removed in order to eliminate excessively general clusters in the results. 12 Our data matrix consisted of a square 406x406 matrix (R) showing role-identities' relations to one other, above a 1,925x406 matrix showing relations between role-identities and sundry other responses. Ones were inserted into the diagonal of the 406x406 matrix for computational reasons. The 1,925x406 matrix was reduced to a 1,061x406 matrix (S) by removing responses in the sundry category that had been given to just one role-identity stimulus. Following procedures introduced by MacKinnon and Heise ( 2010 ), matrix R was raised to Boolean powers to simulate spreading activation of associations from a stimulus word to other role-identities. Results are based on the Boolean square of R since higher powers generated no additional change. First we present our empirical evidence that social institutions are represented in individual minds as patterns of psychological excitation linking institutionally congruent identities. Then we discuss how the psychological structures shape defi nitions of situations, which in turn generate orderly role activities, which in turn instantiate institutional orders.
Economy
Turner ( 1997 : 9) described economic institutions as concerned with gathering, conversion, and distribution of resources. About 16 percent of the identity stimuli in the word-association project loaded on components that were more or less related to Turner's characterization of the economic institution. One of the components clustered occupations largely related to extraction and conversion. A component clustering business and organizational identities and another component clustering food-service identities related mainly to the conversion and distribution of resources.
Occupations: builder architect contractor technician mechanic mason
engineer carpenter electrician manufacturer painter maker inventor plumber creator digger fi reman designer employer miner operator farmer Business Establishments: worker employer employee manager owner secretary boss operator proprietor slave assistant clerk principal supervisor chairperson navigator executive director customer master co-pilot digger typist pilot farmer superior passenger cashier chauffeur captain chief receptionist Food Services: server waiter butler hostess waitress bartender chef host servant stewardess maid gourmet baker According to MacKinnon and Heise ( 2010 : 64) , more than a third of all commonplace identities denote occupations. The under-representation of economic identities in our results refl ected the small sample of role-identities in the word-association project as compared with the number that MacKinnon and Heise considered in their survey of identities -406 compared to 9,199.
Kinship
Both descent and marriage were key aspects of Turner's ( 1997 : 69-70 ) defi nition of the institution of kinship, and two corresponding clusters of roles emerged in MacKinnon and Heise's ( 2010 ) analyses of identity meanings. Turner ( 1997 ) mentioned regulation of sexuality as a key function of the kinship institution, and MacKinnon and Heise's analyses found a cluster of role-identities associated with sexuality.
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Results from analyses of word associations refl ected relations in the extended family, on one hand, and the world of children, on the other. No separate cluster represented a subinstitution of marriage.
Extended Family: uncle grandpa ancestor aunt grandparent nephew father niece relative relation dad elder brother parent cousin grandma kin nag guardian mom sister stranger son mother visitor guest adult mummy grown-up daughter keeper wife kid Children: youth infant adolescent juvenile teenager minor junior doll adult kid snot baby delinquent child brat dependent son chick miner grown-up virgin daughter walker innocent sibling twin boy wimp beginner spouse mother parent snob kin independent rebel niece A world of children is not typically mentioned in discussions of kinship such as Turner's, but it was evident in MacKinnon and Heise's analyses and is reproduced here on a smaller scale. No sexuality cluster emerged from the word association data, but sexuality identities like heterosexual, homosexual, and prostitute were not among the word association stimuli.
Religion
According to Turner ( 1997 ) , the institution of religion encompasses socially constructed supernatural beings, emotional rituals, and ecclesiastic structures. MacKinnon and Heise's ( 2010 ) analyses of identity meanings found two groupings of religious identities, one involving divinities and the other dealing with ecclesiastic structures. Our analysis of word association data produced just one religious cluster.
Baptist Christian saint priest minister Methodist protestant Catholic preacher pope Christ nun angel cardinal savior monk bishop Satan Jesus idol devil rabbi Venus god friar almighty shepherd lord superior follower goddess prey hero maker creator
This cluster combines supernatural beings -Christ, angel, savior, Satan, Jesus, devil, Venus, god, almighty, lord, goddess, creator -with ecclesiastic role-identities.
Polity
According to Turner ( 1997 ) , the institution of polity consists of power structures oriented toward decision making about the coordination and control of actors, and about the disbursing of resources. A political cluster did not emerge initially in MacKinnon and Heise's ( 2010 ) analysis of word meanings, but they were able to produce such a cluster by expanding the sample of words that they analyzed. Our analysis of word association data produced several clusters related to polity.
Rulers: king queen monarch prince emperor ruler princess president dictator governor knight friar communist leader bishop almighty mummy master guide democrat Politics: mayor democrat senator candidate politician governor Nationalism: brave American warrior patriot veteran knight soldier native fi ghter coward Indian sentry recruit citizen captive boxer sailor hero nomad cowboy guard champion idol Military: colonel lieutenant corporal sergeant general commander officer captain major leader chief sheriff deputy marine policeman official sailor president supervisor agent guard cop mayor authority broad principal
The fi rst two clusters have obvious relations to the polity. We believe the nationalism cluster also fi ts, given Turner's ( 1997 ) emphasis on emotionally charged symbols as a means of social control. Military control seems to be an aspect of the polity, though sometimes the military is treated as a separate institution, for example, by Reynolds and Herman-Kinney ( 2003 ) .
Mingling of military roles with police and leadership roles occurs when clusters are based on word association data, but not when clusters are based on dictionary defi nitions. Perhaps the public is ahead of cultural reference books in apprehending emerging militarism of internal control forces.
Law
Turner ( 1997 ) characterized the institution of law as an offshoot of the polity oriented toward creating and administering laws about disputes over resources and about control of actors, and also oriented toward law enforcement. MacKinnon and Heise's ( 2010 ) analyses of identity meanings produced a cluster of role-identities consisting of legal professionals and criminals, and another cluster related to police and law enforcement. Our analysis of word associations produced only one cluster related to law. crook thief burglar robber convict suspect killer criminal bandit murderer gangster victim cop outlaw prisoner villain fugitive inmate con witness salesman traitor delinquent hostage vagrant attorney hood guard detective lawyer liar beggar judge captive sheriff spy politician
Crime is the major emphasis in the word-association cluster, but police and courtroom identities (cop, witness, attorney, detective, lawyer, judge, sheriff) also appear.
Education
According to Turner ( 1997 : 228) , "the emergence of education as a distinctive institution revolves around formalized relations between teacher and student, explicit and delimited curricula, and ritualized passage through a curriculum." MacKinnon and Heise's ( 2010 ) analyses produced a cluster of identities naming kinds of students at all levels of education, along with various Identities, Roles, and Social Institutions 179 names for teachers. Our analysis of word association data produced one education-related cluster.
pupil instructor learner student professor teacher philosopher reader graduate speaker biologist tenor chemist rabbi scientist guide expert conductor coach assistant director superior preacher principal fellow supervisor professional parent
The word-association cluster focuses on students and teachers in schools, but includes some other kinds of teachers as well. The cluster includes some disciplinary specialists in the sciences. Reynolds and Herman-Kinney ( 2003 ) treated scientists in a scientifi c institution, and a science cluster of identities was found by Heise in his unpublished analysis of 2,729 word meanings. The implication is that education and science are somewhat merged in individual minds.
Medicine
Turner ( 1997 ) did not treat medicine as a major social institution, but Talcott Parsons ( 1951 ) devoted a chapter to discussing medical practice as an institutional pattern, and Reynolds and Herman-Kinney ( 2003 ) included a chapter on medicine as an institution in their handbook of symbolic interaction. MacKinnon and Heise's ( 2010 ) analyses of identity meanings produced a cluster consisting of medical practitioners and their patients. The word association data yielded a cluster focused on medical practitioners. physician nurse patient dentist orthodontist orderly shrink quack doctor vet surgeon scientist witch professor lawyer biologist professional engineer sergeant expert Although most of identities in the cluster are obviously medical, the fi nal nine have weak or esoteric associations with the institution.
Leisure
Leisure activities in contemporary society are not often discussed as an institutional domain, but they do seem to fi t the Parsonian perspective on institutions. Also, mass media was considered a distinct institution by Reynolds and Herman-Kinney ( 2003 ) . Additionally, sports and entertainment emerged as distinct role-identity clusters in Heise's unpublished analysis of 2,729 identity meanings. Our analysis of word association data also found sports and entertainment clusters, as well as two other clusters that seem related to leisure activities.
Sports: player athlete pitcher catcher pro opponent coach amateur character champion gymnast umpire referee acrobat jock swimmer professional beginner offi cial expert Entertainment: clown comedian talent juggler singer actor joker dancer magician actress fool alto ballerina tenor producer character acrobat Art Worlds: author publisher poet writer editor critic typist artist reader singer producer ghost creator Fantasy Worlds: monster ghoul goblin vampire demon ghost fairy elf mummy freak giant midget predator dwarf
These results suggest that a leisure institution is emerging in contemporary society.
Quasi-Institutional Clusters
Three clusters from the word association analysis resembled no institution in Parsons and Shils' ( 1951 ) sense of "a complex of institutionalized role integrates which is of strategic signifi cance." However, they are institutionalized areas in the weaker formulation provided by Berger and Luckmann ( 1966 : 54) : Gender: gentleman guy lady gal male blonde brunette receptionist date miss boy girl tramp model stud maiden cheerleader heroine hostess actress chick maid mate stewardess goddess gossip nerd jock secretary partner lord female mister Intimates/Adversaries: buddy neighbor contact pal foe Hispanic girlfriend intimate adversary enemy companion friend boyfriend partner roommate sweetheart lover mate spouse member gossip bully associate boy female mom girl stranger teacher fellow Jesus slob relation mother kin brother guest cousin traitor visitor sibling sister relative husband helper valentine Spurned Others: idiot moron drunk fool loser scapegoat freak hobo wimp bum liar tourist beggar vagrant coward bully winner nerd
The gender cluster aggregates identities that foreground an individual's sex, these perhaps being identities that frame a situation explicitly in sexual terms, beyond the implicit background framing that ordinarily takes place (Ridgeway 2009 ). The intimates/adversaries cluster provides a polarized basis for emotionally orienting toward others, and perhaps such identifi cations are overlaid on others' institutional identities when strong feelings toward the others emerge. The cluster of spurned others provides possible labels for individuals who violate expectations in institutional settings.
Situation Defi nitions and Social Order
Psychological priming of institutional domains often is more specifi c than sociological descriptions of institutions. In our analyses the economy split into three sectors, kinship into two sectors, and polity into four clusters. Also, we found two institutional areas -medicine and leisure -that are not always mentioned in sociological descriptions. Additionally, clusters of non-kin relations and gender relations emerged in our analyses. These results indicate that situations are more institutionally segmented in contemporary minds than sociologists propose. Psychologically, there are about twenty institutional arenas rather than a half dozen or so.
Our empirical results support the following conception of defi ningthe-situation as an individual psychological process. Those who are enacting specifi c roles provide perceivable cues about their identities via their countenance, attire, or their introductory comments. Others encountering them employ these cues as they defi ne the situation: perceiving the cues, 13 recognizing the role-player's identity, experiencing consciousness of associated identities, and adopting a related identity as their self-identifi cation for ensuing interaction. Because institutional identities evoke associations of related institutional identities, the presence of an institutional role-player causes others to defi ne the situation in terms of that institution, and to take a reciprocal role with respect to the original role-player. Thus, initial presence of an institutional actor maintains appropriate institutional activity in the setting.
Sentiments and Interdependence Relations
In the middle of Figure 9 .1 are reciprocal relations between identity meanings, roles, and interpersonal activities at the micro-sociological level. Next we elaborate a facet of this stratum arguing that affective meanings of identities relate to interdependence states among social interactants, such that the structure of game matrices used in exchange and rational choice theories corresponds to the evaluation , potency , and activity dimensions of affective meaning. The implication is that identity meanings generate interdependencies among interactants, and additionally emergent interdependence in social situations transforms the affective meanings of identities and the nature of corresponding roles. Scholl ( 2013 ) argued that the evaluation, potency, and activity dimensions employed by affect control theory "refl ect the inherent logic of any exchange between self-interested individuals" ( 2013 : 19) in interdependence relations. The coordination and collaboration aspects of interdependence relations are generally depicted in game matrices (e.g., Cook and Rice 2006 ; Kelley 1979 ) , and the structure of game matrices connects to the evaluation, potency, and activity dimensions of affective meaning in the following ways according to interdependence theory (Kelley 1979 ; Kelley et al. 2003 ; Scholl 2013 ) .
Evaluation refl ects the correspondence of outcomes for participants in interdependence relations. Correspondence of outcomes promotes coordination of individual efforts and affi liation, while the opposite of correspondence, zero-sum outcomes, promotes competition and hostility. Friends develop out of similar or compatible interests; enemies out of competing interests. Thus, 13 Cues also are provided by features of the physical setting such as labelled buildings and settings containing emblems, icons, or totems. 14 Schedules govern individuals' occupation of institutional identities without situational cues (Heise 2007 ) . Potency refl ects possible differences in dependence , which establish (un) equal power among interactants (Emerson 1962 ) , inducing impressions of powerfulness, strength, tenacity, or their opposites.
Activity arises from the magnitude of dependence in a game matrix: The larger the differences between alternative outcomes for each interactant, the more important it is to get the better outcome instead of the worse one. So, larger differences have a stronger motivational effect leading to more emotional arousal and behavioral activation.
In work outside interdependence theory, Fennell and Baddeley ( 2013 ) identifi ed three dimensions of options in decision-making -reward , risk , and uncertainty -and connected them explicitly to the evaluation, potency, and activity dimensions of the semantic differential. They conducted an experiment in which subjects risked faux bank funds to bet on outcomes associated with six shapes. A win resulted in funds being added to the subject's bank account along with display of a smiley face; a loss caused funds to be removed from the subject's bank account with display of a sad face; and an indifferent outcome involved no change in the subject's bank account and display of a neutral face. Two shapes (randomly selected for each subject) had high probability of wins if they were selected, two shapes had high probability of losses, and two shapes had a high probability of indifferent outcomes. Subject evaluation of a shape changed in direct correspondence to that shape's association with wins relative to wins plus losses. Potency of a shape increased to the extent that losses predominated in win, loss, or indifferent events associated with that shape. And activity increased with the uncertainty or lack of control associated with a choice. Thus this study demonstrated that a person's history of rewards and punishments with an object of choice changes the affective meaning that the individual associates with that object.
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Of course, humans rarely consider dependencies and outcomes in abstract matrix terms and engage in the rational thought that such matrices require. Rather, they simply judge from both verbal and nonverbal communication, 16 and at a more or less preconscious level, whether the other seems nice and friendly or unkind and hostile (signaling the degree of correspondence and cooperation to be expected); whether the other is strong or weak, dominant or submissive (signaling differences in dependence); and whether the other is aroused or calm (signaling the magnitude of dependence in the situation). 15 An even more direct test of affective meaning as a common basis of affect control theory and interdependence or exchange theory would be to ask experienced players to deliver ratings of different game structures on the three emotional dimensions and to register their following actions. A fi rst example approaching such an investigation is provided by Wubben ( 2009 Thereby people substitute fast thinking based on affect for the slow thinking of rationality (Kahneman 2011 ) in order to estimate potential outcomes for self and other in interdependence relations. The parallel between the evaluation, potency, and activity dimensions of affective meaning and the structure of dependencies represented in game matrices suggests that affect control theory could be applied to predict outcomes of interdependence relations represented in game matrices. Referring to Figure 9 .1 , the affective meanings of identities motivate individuals to engage in identity-confi rming roles and social interaction. This can be recast in terms of interdependence relations and game matrices by translating evaluation, potency, and activity outcomes of social interaction into correspondence outcomes, difference in dependence, and magnitude of dependence, respectively.
Affect control theory has an added appeal over other micro-explanations. Because it is based on the motivation to avoid defl ections from cultural sentiments embedded in the meanings of a common language, it is a truly sociological theory of social order. It is cultural consensus rather than individual opinion that determines what is good or bad, powerful or powerless, active or passive; and the motivational principle of avoiding defl ections from cultural sentiments is based on a socioemotional view of consistency rather than an individual psychological one. This is not to deny, of course, that there are individual differences in cultural sentiments, resulting from socialization experiences, socioeconomic status, and membership in subcultures.
Affect Control and Rational Choice
It is well known from experimental game research that people usually do not behave according to a homo economicus logic and that they often apply different meanings to an abstract game description. We use an example from Kelley ( 1979 : 24-29) to illustrate and discuss this fi nding in terms of the parallel between the evaluation, potency, and activity dimensions of affective meaning and the structure of game matrices.
Kelley conducted a survey of 100 young couples who estimated their preferences within a typical dilemma. On a scale of -10 to +10, the partners separately assessed how they feel about cleaning their joint apartment (a) together, (b) by the man only, (c) by the woman only, or (d) not at all. While the unpleasant task of cleaning must be done, each person has to perform other important tasks as well. So, a homo economicus would assign the highest value to the alternative where the other cleans, allowing self to address other important tasks, and would assign the lowest value to being exploited. Yet, as illustrated in Figure 9 .2 , the average valuations turn out to be quite different.
To begin with, the matrix does not represent a dilemma but largely a correspondence outcome. Obviously, a cooperative transformation of a potential dilemma has occurred, and the collaboration based on affi liation, sympathy, and love can proceed smoothly because both partners value joint cleaning most. Kelley ( 1979 : chaps. 3 , 5 ) One also has to consider gender stereotypes in interpreting the empirical pattern reported in Figure 9 .2 . (1) Cleaning is more positive for women than for men; in particular, women evaluate slightly negatively if their man cleans alone ("exploiting" him), but not if they themselves clean alone (being "exploited").
(2) Men are somewhat more dependent in their well-being on women who accept these role expectations.
18 (3) The activation is stronger in women than in men comparing the differences between the highest and the lowest valuation. Of course these are speculative reconstructions requiring detailed empirical investigations to substantiate them.
In any case, this example of interdependence analysis suggests that the rationality of human decisions and actions should not be judged from a homo economicus perspective alone. One must also take the cultural meanings of role-identities into account. When one does so, ostensibly non-rational (from Kelley, 1979 , p. 25) .
17 Averaged male and female EPA profi les from University of North Carolina 1978 data on cultural sentiments. Working was substituted as a proxy for cleaning , which was not included in the data. 18 Calculated as column differences in men's triangles versus row differences in women's triangles. 
Summary and Conclusion
We identifi ed the cultural meanings of institutional identities and related roles as the micro-foundation of social order. Guided by cultural knowledge and energized by cultural sentiments, the enactment of institutional identities and roles in everyday social life ensures the continual reproduction and legitimation of social institutions. We advanced two complementary, micro-level explanations of social order: a cognitive approach combining a classic micro-sociological theory of institutions with a recent method for analyzing the causal structures of social actions in institutional settings; and an affective approach based on affect control theory. We then presented two analyses that illustrate some of these ideas. The fi rst shows that the full range of social institutions can be revealed by a network analysis of cognitive-denotative associations among institutional identities and roles. The second shows how the evaluation, potency, and activity dimensions of affective-connotative meaning employed by affect control theory are inherent in the logic of interdependence underlying rational choice and exchange theories as represented in game matrices. Parsons ( 1951 ) based his answer to the "Hobbesian problem of order" (Parsons 1937 ) on a consensus of social values (essentially, cognitions imbued with affect). Mead ( 1934 ) proposed that social integration is based on a consensus of cognitive meanings embodied in signifi cant symbols or language (see MacKinnon 1994 ), a position that is mostly implicit in Berger and Luckmann ( 1966 ) . Affect control theory explains social order in terms of culturally shared sentiments, and data supports this consensus theory of social order. Research has shown that there really is a substantial amount of consensus of cultural sentiments within a culture (Heise 2010 ; Ambrasat et al. 2014 ) as well as a surprising amount across cultures (Heise 2014b ) .
At the same time, none of the theorists cited earlier (with the possible and debateable exception of Parsons) views consensus as an absolute quantity, but rather as a working consensus ensuring a reasonable level of social order while allowing for deviance, confl ict, and social change. In this regard, Berger and Luckmann have acknowledged that all symbolic universes of meaning legitimating the institutional world are "incipiently problematic" ( 1966 : 106); and affect control research has always found individual differences in cultural sentiments, as indicated by modest standard deviations in EPA measurement.
Although based on maintaining consistency with cultural sentiments, affect control theory differs from psychological consistency theories such as Heider's ( 1946 ) balance theory and Festinger's ( 1957 ) dissonance theory, which focus on consistency or order in individual minds. In contrast, maintaining consistency with culturally-shared sentiments "binds together all well-socialized people within a given culture through their common language and . . . collective meaning space" (Scholl 2013 : 21) . "The motivation to avoid larger defl ections is a truly socio-emotional consistency because people thereby gain security in their worldview, harvest the experience of their culture and preserve their general cooperation opportunities through a common understanding of the emotional meaning of relevant social aspects." (Scholl 2013 : 23) .
